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MONEY POLITICS: CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND THE
'SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
MARTY JEZER*
ELLEN MILLER*"
To state that there is a crisis in American democracy is
neither startling nor controversial. Indeed, the assertion has
become conventional wisdom about which most political com-
mentators and ordinary citizens agree. According to political
journalist EJ. Dionne in Why Americans Hate Politics, "Over the
last three decades, the faith of the American people in their dem-
ocratic institutions has declined, and Americans have begun to
doubt their ability to improve the world through politics."' In
his book Who Will Tell the People, William Greider observed, "The
things that Americans were taught and still wish to believe about
self-government - the articles of civic faith we loosely call
democracy - no longer seem to fit the present reality."2 In
announcing the publication of The Kettering Foundation's 1991
study, Citizens and Politics: A View from Main Street America, David
Matthews, president of the foundation, said, "Many Americans
don't believe they are living in a democracy. They describe the
present political system as impervious to public direction."3 Sum-
marizing the evolution of public opinion on the state of Ameri-
can democracy, pollster Gordon S. Black wrote, "Virtually every
major national political polling organization has documented a
sharp downturn in confidence in government institutions dating
back more than 15 years. "'
* Member of the Working Group for Electoral Democracy.
** Executive Director of the Center for Responsive Politics.
1. E.J. DIONNE, JR., WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS 9 (1991).
2. WILLIAM GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE PEOPLE: THE BETRAYAL OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 11 (1992).
3. Kettering Foundation, Kettering Foundation News: New Report
Debunks Political "Apathy" Myth (June 4, 1991) (press release, available from
the Kettering Foundation) [hereinafter Kettering].
4. Gordon S. Black, The Politics of American Discontent: A Study of
Voter Discontent 7 (June 2, 1992) (unpublished paper, on file with author). A
public opinion poll may provide only a fleeting glimpse of what the public is
thinking, but, in the aggregate, polls do indicate the contours of public
sentiment. According to Black's most recent data, more than 59% of the all
voters said they were "dissatisfied" and "angry" at the Presidency, both houses of
Congress, and the two major political parties. Fifty percent of all voters
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The causes of this crisis are as complex as they are many.
But at the core is the issue of private financing of political cam-
paigns. As Greider wrote, "The scandalous question that hangs
over modern government and excites perpetual outrage is about
political money and what it buys."5 To be sure, the American tra-
dition of privately financed election campaigns has always given
the wealthy minority disproportionate power. But the skyrocket-
ing costs of political campaigning has increased their hold on the
political system.6 At the same time, it has diminished the role of
ordinary citizens in the political process. Expensive television
advertisements, based on sociometric data from focus groups and
public opinion polls, have taken the place of personal contact
between candidates and voters. And professional campaign staffs
have replaced citizen volunteers in organizing grassroots cam-
paign efforts.
Although there are always a few candidates who win public
office by boasting of their refusal to take special interest money,
they are usually in unique situations.7 Whatever personal feel-
ings candidates have about raising private money, they are
enmeshed in a system in which money is a necessity for political
success. Many politicians hate fundraising and find it difficult
and burdensome to do. But candidates who are reluctant to
devote time to raising campaign money from private sources
cede an enormous political advantage to their political rivals.8
And the convertibility of personal wealth into political currency
gives the numerically-marginal economic elite the definitive
voice in American democracy.
expressed discontent and anger with their governor, and 49% said they were
discontent and angry with their state legislature. Id. at 7-8.
5. GREIDER, supra note 2, at 25.
6. The average cost of a winning campaign for the House of
Representatives (in 1992 dollars) rose from $200,000 in 1974 to $543,000 in
1992. LARRY MAKINSON, THE PRICE OF ADMISSION: CAMPAIGN SPENDING IN THE
1992 ELECTIONS 10 (1993).
7. And those candidates often are being hypocritical. Candidate pledges
not to take money from political action committees (PACs) should be viewed by
the public with the utmost suspicion. What candidates do not raise in PAC
money is usually raised from individuals who represent the same kinds of vested
groups as PACs. David Boren (D-OK), for example, boasts of not taking PAC
money. In his last election (1990), he raised $1.7 million, eighty-one percent of
which came from large (over $200) contributors, including $177,000 from
individuals connected to the oil and gas industry.
8. In a 1987 survey of members of the 100th Congress, the Center for
Responsive Politics found that almost half of the members felt that they spent
too much time raising money and that raising money interfered with their work
day. See CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, CONGRESS SPEAKS - A SURVEY OF THE
100TH CONGRESS 82 (1988).
MONEY POLITICS
I. PRIVATE MONEY IN PUBLIC POLITICS DISCREDITS AMERICAN
ELECTIONS
Campaigning for elective office has become a multi-billion
dollar business. In the 1992 election cycle, candidates for federal
office spent $1,476,600,000.' An estimated $1.5 billion was spent
by candidates for state and local offices.' ° Very little of this
money came from ordinary citizens." Adding up all PAC contri-
butions, large (over $200) individual contributions, and all mon-
ies that candidates privately borrowed or contributed to
themselves out of their own personal funds, the Center for
Responsive Politics has computed that less than one percent of
the population provided a total of 77% of all campaign contribu-
tions to the 1992 congressional races.1 2 Most of this money is
special interest money, contributed by PACs and wealthy "vested
individuals" who have direct economic stakes in all facets of gov-
ernment policy.' 3
9. Another $10.2 million dollars was spent by the supporters of various
federal candidates in the form of independent expenditures. Center for
Responsive Politics, Analysis of Federal Election Commission Records,
unpublished analysis, on file with the Center for Responsive Politics.
10. Because disclosure requirements in campaign finance law differ from
state to state and there is no official repository for the collection of state
campaign finance data, the state and local figure is an estimate. But where data
is available, the evidence is that campaign costs for state elections are rising at a
rate comparable to that of federal elections. In Oregon, for example, campaign
spending (in real dollars) for seats in the state legislature was approximately ten
higher in 1992 than it was in 1972. See OSPIRG Education Fund, PACS Over
People: 20-Year Trends in Who Finances Oregon Politicians 6-7 (1993)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the OSPIRG Education Fund).
11. According the Center for Responsive Politics (analysis based on data
from the Federal Election Commission), in the 1992 congressional elections
29% of the candidates money came from political action committees, and 35%
came from individuals giving over $200 to the candidate. Only 19% came from
individuals contributing less than $200. A small proportion of that, it may be
assumed, came from individuals making $5 to $50 contributions. See Center for
Responsive Politics, supra note 9.
12. Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primay,
11 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 273, 293 (1993).
13. In the 1992 Congressional elections, political action committees
(PACs) affiliated with business interests outspent PACs affiliated with labor
$127 million to $43.1 million, a ratio of almost 3:1. LARsY MAKINSON, PACS IN
PROFILE: SPENDING PArrERNS IN THE 1992 ELECFION 3 (1993). When large
individual contributions and soft money are factored in the dominance of
business money becomes far larger. The Center for Responsive Politics "has
documented that, of all contributions to congressional campaigns, business
interests outgive labor interest by a ratio of 4.5:1." Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note
12, at 293 n.117.
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A. Access to Wealth Is the Decisive Factor in Whether a Candidate
Can Run a Serious Race for Public Office
It is the triumph of our democratic meritocracy that one
doesn't have to always be rich to win elective office.14 But it is
the failing of our political democracy that obliges most candi-
dates to craft their politics to appeal to those who are. For the
ability to raise money is an essential key to success in American
elections. According to Norman Ornstein, a Resident Scholar at
the conservative American Enterprise Institute, current cam-
paign finance law "discourages experienced and able candidates
because of the daunting task of raising money."' 5 Unless a candi-
date has personal wealth or ajob that will provide a paid leave of
absence, running for office represents a sacrifice that people of
ordinary means cannot afford. In Bullock v. Carter,6 Chief Justice
Burger wrote that "potential office seekers lacking both personal
wealth and affluent backers are in every practical sense pre-
cluded from seeking the nomination of their chosen party, no
matter how qualified they might be, and no matter how broad or
enthusiastic their popular support. " "
B. Rich and Powerful Monied Interests Screen the Candidates Even
Before the Campaign Begins
Candidates lacking the personal wealth to finance their own
campaigns for public office must tailor their politics to please the
individuals and organizations whom they solicit for money. And
it is especially during the pre-nomination or pre-primary stage of
an election campaign when wealthy individuals and political
action committees, accountable to no one, not even a political
party, wield enormous power. Prospective candidates contem-
plating running for office who do not pass the muster of these
monied interests at the start of a campaign usually cannot pass
the test of "viability" as determined by the media. Without cam-
paign funds, they cannot create the campaign apparatus to carry
them through the primary and/or convention nominating stage
of the electoral process. The ability to raise "seed" money in
14. At least 51 out of 100 Senators in the current Congress are
millionaires. Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 12, at 289 (citing Ten Fun Facts About
Congress, ROLL CALL, Apr. 23, 1992, at 3).
15. LAWRENCE N. HANSEN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN CANDIDATE: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE REASONS CMZENS Do NOT SEEK ELEcrrvE OFFICE, The Joyce
Foundation 50 (1991).
16. 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (holding a requirement that candidates
intending to run in the Texas primary pay a high filing-fee to get their name on
the ballot to be unconstitutioinal).
17. 405 U.S. at 143.
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large sums for start-up costs before formal campaigning begins
gives a candidate credibility among other fundraisers and big
contributors. 8 Candidates who show that they can raise large
sums of money also gain immediate credibility with the news
media, which early in the campaign decides which candidates to
actively cover. Thus, candidates without money or access to big
contributors begin their campaigns in a Catch-22 situation.
Without money to give them credibility - which is different
from showing that they have public support - the media won't
treat them as serious candidates, and large contributors, who
don't squander money on who they perceive as marginal candi-
dates, won't give them the start-up money that might attract the
media's attention.
The power of large contributors to screen candidates well
before the public gets an opportunity to express its support
greatly limits the scope of debate in the ensuing political con-
test." Their ability to winnow out candidates who do not
espouse their political views enables them to define which pro-
grams and ideas have legitimacy. Candidates who do not adhere
to the views of the big campaign contributors do not get the
money to test their ideas before the voting public.
C. Most Large Campaign Contributors Give Their Money to
Incumbents
Fundraising is an institutionalized (and time-consuming)
part of Washington's political culture. The more issues - agri-
culture, energy, health care, housing, public works, etc. - that
are subject to federal legislation, the more opportunity there is
for members of Congress to solicit and receive campaign dona-
tions from the individuals and organizations that stand to profit
from the details of the legislation.20
18. RheaJezer (a cousin of one of the authors), ran for Congress in 1992
in New York's 25th CD. Outspent almost 4:1 by the incumbentJames T. Walsh,
she garnered 44.3% of the vote. [PRICE OF ADMISSION, supra note 7, at 128]. In
February 1992, she wrote a fundraising letter to her supporters emphasizing the
need for early money. Noting that she already had the endorsement of "several
national Women's groups and large labor unions," she added that "in order to
be put on targeted lists, I need even earlier money from individuals. By the end
of March I have to demonstrate commitment from my supporters." Obviously,
a candidate who has the support of a few wealthy individuals has an easier time
demonstrating support than a candidate who has to raise the money from many
individuals in small denominations.
19. See Ed Garvey, It's Money That Matters: A Candidate Looks Back in Anger,
THE PROGRESSIVE, Mar. 20, 1989, at 17.
20. BROOKS JACKSON, HONEST GRAFT: BIG MONEY AND THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL PROCESS 36 (1988).
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Much of the fundraising takes place legally within the capi-
tol building. It's not uncommon for lobbyists to drop-off checks
worth up to $10,000 in the offices of members of Congress.2'
Though no words are exchanged (federal law prohibits
lawmakers - but not their aides - from discussing, soliciting, or
collecting campaign contributions in the offices), lawmakers
know which interest groups the lobbyists represent. Since it is
easier to raise large amounts of money from interest groups with
lobbyists stationed in Congress than it is to raise small amounts of
money from constituents at spaghetti dinners in their home dis-
tricts, a relationship of dependency develops between incumbent
and large contributors. And special interests who have cultivated
a personal relationship are reluctant to jeopardize that relation-
ship by giving their money to challengers who, the record shows,
are statistically unlikely to win.
The advantage that incumbents have over their challengers
is apparent in the difference between the amount of money that
they have to spend on their re-election as against the amount of
money their challengers have to defeat them. In the 1992 elec-
tions for the House of Representative, the average incumbent
spent $578,000 against $148,000 for the average challenger. Win-
ners outspent losing candidates on an average of $543,599 to
$201,263. In the Senate, winning candidates spent an average of
$3,930,638 against $2,034,980 for losing candidates.22 By giving
most of their money to incumbents, the big campaign contribu-
tors assure a low re-election turn-over in elected officials. In
1992, the rate of reelection for the House of Representatives was
89.5%.23 For the U.S. Senate, it was 85.7%.4
21. Richard L. Berke, An Edge for Incumbents: Loopholes That Pay Off N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1990, at A16.
22. MAMNSON, supra note 6, at 11. The aggregate amount of money that
candidates for the U.S. Senate spend is meaningless because, unlike
congressional districts which have equivalent populations, the population of the
states differs greatly. Therefore, the amount of candidate spending does not
always correlate with the population of a state. The first and third most
expensive Senate races in history ($25.9 and $21.1 million) took place in North
Carolina. North Carolina ranks tenth in population among the states. Both
races involved SenatorJesse Helms who spent $17.7 million in 1990 and $16.9
million in 1984 in successful bids for re-election. LARRY MAKiNSON, OPEN
SECRETS: THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONGRESSIONAL MONEY AND POLrrIcs 271
(1990) [hereinafter OPEN SECRETS].
23. Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 12, at 292-93. Between 1983 and 1992,
the reelection rate for the U.S. House of Representatives has been 93%.
Makinson, supra note 22, at 5.
24. Id. at 293. Between 1983 and 1982, the reelection rate incumbents in
the U.S. Senate has averaged 87%. Makinson, supra note 22, at 5.
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D. Incumbents Often Raise More Money than They Spend in Any
One Election and Therefore Enter a New Election Cycles
with Money Already in the Bank
The average House winner ended the 1992 campaign with a
balance of $73,496, while the average Senate winner looked
ahead to the next campaign with $193,749 already collected.25
These warchests discourage challengers from competing against
them and gives them an unfair advantage in fundraising over
those intrepid challengers who do run against them and who
must raise money from scratch.
Jim Hightower, a popular Commissioner of Agriculture in
Texas from 1982 to 1992, contemplated the necessity of raising
$15 million to challenge Senator Phil Gramm in the 1990 elec-
tion and decided not to run. He later commented, "I would have
to spend more time in the living rooms of the wealthy raising
money than I could out in the communities raising issues, raising
hopes and raising hell."26
The relative ease with which incumbents raise money usually
has a decisive effect on the outcome of a closely-contested electo-
ral contest. While incumbents are spending money raised even
before the campaign has begun, challengers must often divert
time from actively campaigning in order to raise money so they
can continue to campaign. For example, in the closely fought
1992 election for United States Senator for New York, the incum-
bent, Republican Alfonse M. D'Amato began the campaign with
almost $3 million in his war-chest. 27 (Much of D'Amato's money,
according to the New York Times, came "from people or busi-
nesses with matters pending before one of the Senate commit-
25. MAKINSON, supra note 6, at 8. To be sure, "average" may not be an
accurate indication of the problem. The numbers vary widely. Some winners
spent all of their money in the 1992 election; but among those who did not,
Senator Robert Dole ($1,756,483) and Representative Charles E. Schumer
($2,116,686) had the largest end-of-year campaign balances in their respective
houses of Congress. Id.
26. Jim Hightower, "I Do Not Choose to Run": Raising Issues, Hope and
Hell, THE NATION, Feb. 6, 1989, at 160. See OPEN SECRETS, supra note 22. In the
six-year cycle leading up to the 1990 election, Gramm raised $16.2 million (44%
of which came from large - over $200 - contributors) and outspent his
Democratic opponent, Hugh Palmer, $12.4 million to $1.6 million. Gramm
won the election with 60% and had $4.1 million left over in readiness for his
1996 reelection campaign. A member of the Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs Committee, Gramm raised more than $1.2 million in contributions from
finance, insurance, and real estate interests. This is a typical pattern of
campaign contributions. See infra note 48.
27. Id. at 222.
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tees on which he has served.")2" While D'Amato was able to
flood the airwaves with television ads, his opponent, New York
Attorney General Robert Abrams, was forced to suspend active
campaigning at crucial times (and stop his television advertising)
in order to "work the phones" and raise money.29 Ultimately,
Abrams raised $6 million, but D'Amato raised more than $11
million."0 Despite being outspent almost two to one, Abrams
came within 1.2 percentage points of winning the election."1
Empirical evidence sustained by statistical data indicates
that money, or the access to money, determines which candi-
dates have the resources to make a serious run for elective office,
which programs candidates can safely advocate without jeopard-
izing their access to private money, and which candidates are
likely to win elective office. Further, since most campaign contri-
butions- go to incumbents, challengers run for office at a severe
disadvantage and incumbents, unless they are charged with gross
or criminal misconduct, are almost certain to win. The result is a
dynamic that undermines the core values of fairness and equality
that give substance to the democratic process and make a mock-
ery of the principle of "one person, one vote." But-private money
does more than tilt the electoral playing field to the advantage of
those with wealth and power. As we shall argue in Part II below,
it also compromises our system of representative government,
influencing to an inappropriate and undemocratic degree how
legislation is framed and drafted and which legislative bills are
passed or defeated.
II. PRIVATE MONEY COMPROMISES THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
While a direct correlation between campaign contributions
and voting patterns is difficult to establish in all cases, few would
argue that special interests give politicians money for altruistic
purposes or a love of democracy.3 2 As conservative Senator Barry
Goldwater once complained, "[I]t is not 'we the people,' but
28. Jane Fritsch, D'Amato Serves as a Magnet for Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
1992, at Al; see also Makinson, supra note 27, at 222-23.
29. Martin Gottlieb, With Cash Tight, Abrams Forgoes Pressing Resh for
Raising Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1991, at Al.
30. MAKINSON, supra note 6, at 128.
31. Id. at 130.
32. But some do. Looking and not finding evidence of a "smoking gun"
(in other words, overt of bribery) and thus unable to make a definitive
correlation between campaign contributions and an officeholder's vote in
Congress, some political scientists, ignoring the subtle and complex dynamics
of campaign fundraising, reject the idea that campaign contributions in any way
influence the actions of legislators. See HERBERT ALEXANDER, STRATEGIES FOR
ELECTORAL REFORM, PROJECT FOR COMPREHENSIVE CAMPAIGN REFORM 2-3 (1989);
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political action committees and moneyed interests who are set-
ting the nation's agenda and are influencing the position of can-
didates on the important issues of the day.""3 Goldwater's
complaint in echoed by many other politicians across the polit-
ical spectrum. Speaking as a member of Congress, Goldwater's
ideological opposite, Barney Frank (D-MA), has said, "We are the
only human beings in the world who are expected to take
thousands of dollars from perfect strangers on important matters
and not be affected by it." 4 To which Senate Minority Leader
Robert Dole (R-KS) concurs: "when these political action com-
mittees give money, they expect something in return other than
good government," he has said.35 Thomas Ashley, a Democrat
who has worked both sides of the aisle - as a twenty five year
veteran in the House of Representatives and recently as the chief
lobbyist for the Association of Bank Holding Companies - told
William Greider that influencing legislation rather than simply
gaining access to members of Congress is the purpose of special
interest campaign contributions. "You put your money out and
you collect at the other end," he said. "You have access and more
than that. Access is really a cowardly word because the legislation
is the bottom line. Believe me, the money is not directed at
access. It's directed at the bottom line."36
A. The Corrupting Influence that Private Campaign Contributions
Have Over Public Politics Is Systematic
Barring direct evidence of overt bribery, the principal way of
substantiating the charge that money buys favors in Congress is
by correlating the pattern of interest group giving with the way
members of Congress vote on particular issues.
For example, the power of the National Rifle Association
(NRA) to block legislative efforts at gun control is legendary.
One of its major defeats came in May 1991 when the House
adopted the Brady Bill by a margin of 239-186. The NRA
attempted to defeat the Brady Bill by backing an amendment
introduced by Harley 0. Staggers,Jr. (D-WVa). This amendment
was defeated 193-234. In the period leading up the vote on the
LARRY SABATO, PAC POWER: INSIDE THE WORLD OF POLITICAL ACTION
CoMMirEEs 132-40 (1984).
33. PHILIP M. STERN, THE BEST CONGRESS MONEY CAN Buy 194 (1988)).
34. Paul Taylor, Lobbyists' Success at Raising Funds Proves Costly, WASH.
POST, Aug. 2, 1983, at A2 (cited in HEDRICK SMITH, THE POWER GAME: How
WASHINGTON WoRKs 257 (1988)).
35. HEDRICK SMITH, THE POWER GAME: How WASHINGTON WORKS 257
(1988).
36. GREIDER, supra note 2, at 249, 253.
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Brady Bill, the NRA gave House Republicans $1,114,507, an aver-
age of $6,673 each. In addition, the NRA gave House Democrats
$961,051, an average of $3,614 each. Although the difference in
contributions received by Republicans and Democrats was less
than 2:1, the difference in contributions between House mem-
bers who supported the NRA's Staggers Amendment and those
who opposed it was more than 7:1. 37
Campaign contributions obviously do not effect all votes.
Corporate money is not going to persuade Democrats from dis-
tricts with a strong labor movement to vote against labor's inter-
ests. Nor are Republicans from affluent districts likely to vote
with labor no matter how much money PACs affiliated with the
AFL-CIO might send their way. And individual members of Con-
gress have strong beliefs on many issues and will vote these
beliefs no matter which special interest is offering them money.
But there are unique situations in which members of Congress
are free to either vote their conscience (if they feel passionately
about an issue), or vote with an eye on campaign contributions
(if they have no keen interest in the issue). Some examples are:
1. The less visible an issue, the easier it is for campaign contributors
to sway congressional voting.
* The Comprehensive Mining Reform Bill of 1993 (S. 257)
called for mining companies to pay royalties (for the first time)
on hard rock minerals such as gold, silver, and copper mined on
public lands. The Senators who co-sponsored the bill received,
on average, one-tenth as much money from mining PACs as Sen-
ators who co-sponsored an industry-backed "reform bill" (S. 775)
that would have allowed the mining companies to continue oper-
ating on public land without paying any royalties to the federal
government.38 Except in those few far-western states where hard
rock mining is an important economic activity, this issue gener-
ated very little political debate or media coverage. Congress ulti-
mately passed the industry-backed bill that contained no
royalties. For an investment of approximately $1.1 million, the
amount of money, the 36 PACs that represent the hard-rock min-
ing gave to members of the 1992 Congress,39 the industry pock-
37. Public Citizen's Congress Watch, The National Rifle Association's
Semi-Automatic Checkbook: A Review of Campaign Contributions to Members
of Congress (1985-1990) Correlating Support for the NRA's Position on the
Brady Bill 1-2 (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Public Citizen's
Congress Watch).
38. U.S. Public Interest Research Group, MINING THE CONGRESS:
INDusTRY GETS THE GOLD, TAXPAYERS GET THE SHAFr, September 1983 at 1
[hereinafter MINING].
39. MAKINSON, supra note 13, at 39.
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eted approximately $4 billion in royalties that, had S 257 passed,
would have gone into the U.S. Treasury.4"
9 "Seventeen of the top 20 recipients of timber PAC contri-
butions in the House voted against [a 1992 amendment] that
would have cut $18 million for timber sales preparation and road
construction in roadless areas of our National Forests. Those vot-
ing against the amendment received 72 percent of all timber
PAC contributions to House members in 1992, almost three
times more than supporters of the amendment."4
2. Big money has more impact behind the scenes, in subcommittee
hearings and in the early stages of the legislative process, than it has once
a bill reaches thefloor where debate is scrutinized by the media and watch-
dog groups.
* The Savings and Loan scandal, which threatens to cost the
American people as much as $500 billion over the next thirty
years, was a result, to a large degree, of legislation passed by Con-
gress that deregulated the industry and raised the amount on
federal insured deposits from $40,000 to $100,000. During the
period between 1985 and 1987 when Congress first became
aware that the extravagant and risky investments of some S&L
executives were bankrupting the system, the industry poured
more than $1.8 million into the campaign war chests of members
of Congress. A key congressional vote was a 1987 effort to pro-
vide $15 billion to bail out insolvent S&L. The industry fought
this bailout because it would have meant a return of government
regulation. By a vote of 25 to 24, the House Banking Committee
caved in to the industry's demands and reduced funding for the
bailout from $15 to $5 billion. The 25 members of the Banking
Committee that supported the industry position received cam-
paign contributions averaging $20,0339 during the period of
1981-1986 when the S&L's were a policy issue. The 24 opponents
of the measure received on average $8,780. For an investment in
campaign contributions of $1.8 million, the S&L industry helped
win approval of legislation that will cost American taxpayers bil-
lions of dollars.42
* Campaign contributions, more than national priorities
decided upon by rational debate, shaped the final version of
40. MINING, supra note 39, at 1.
41. Western Ancient Forest Campaign and U.S. Public Interest Research
Group, American Taxpayers' Forest Destroyed: Members of Congress Reap the
Benefits 3-4 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the U.S. Public
Interest Research Group).
42. JEAN COBB, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRrTY, SHORT-CHANGED: How
CONGRESS AND SPECIAL INTERESTS BENEFIT AT THE EXPENSE OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 16-19 (1991).
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President Clinton's National Energy Security Act of 1993. On
four key votes on crucial environmental issues - global warm-
ing, nuclear licensing, automobile milage standards, and oil drill-
ing in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge - the Senate Energy
Committee adopted the position of the energy industry over the
opposition of environmental and consumer organizations.
Between 1985 and 1991, 187 PACs energy industry PACS con-
cerned with those four issues contributed more than $3 million
to members of the Senate Energy Committee.43
Environmental organizations, no matter how much grass-
roots support they enjoy, cannot compete in campaign contribu-
tions with their corporate opponents. "We do have a small PAC,
about $500,000 a year," Dan Becker, a Sierra Club lobbyist
acknowledges. "But when I call on congresspersons, they know
the absolute maximum campaign contributions they can get
from me is $10,000. A Chemical Manufacturers Association lob-
byist is backed by hundreds of companies, each of which give
that candidate $10,000.""4 Curtis Moore, a Washington lawyer
who was formerly the Republican counsel on the Senate Environ-
ment and Public Works Committee, has described the way that
campaign contributions affect legislation on environmental
issues. "If I represent an industry, I can always get into an argu-
ment in the Executive Branch or in Congress by nature of the
fact that I have money," he told William Greider. "But if you're
an environmental group, you can't get into the argument unless
they want to let you in." And, as Moore explained, "they," mean-
ing the insiders, won't let you in unless you agree to the way that
the special interest groups have already defined and narrowed
the issue.45
e What is true for environmental issues is true for other
issues in which government activity affects the way vested inter-
43. U.S. Public Interest Research Group, Abuse of Power: Energy
Industry Money & the Johnston-Wallop Energy Package 1 (1992) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the U.S. Public Interest Research Group).
44. Mark Dowie, The Selling (Out) of the Greens, The Nation, April 18, 1994,
515-516. According to PRICE OF ADMISSION, supra note 6, at 171, in 1992
individuals and PACS associated with the chemical industry contributed $1.5
million to congressional candidates. The Sierra Club, which has the largest
environmental PAC, contributed $607,000. But environmental organizations
like the Sierra Club are concerned with public policy on many fronts, including
agriculture, energy, natural resources, transportation, waste management, and
so on. Corporations involved in these areas contribute additional millions to
political candidates. In 1992, the oil industry, e.g., gave congressional
candidates 4.6 million, electric utilities gave $3.9 million and waste
management companies gave $844,000 thousand.
45. GREIDER, supra note 2, at 110-111, 162, 215-216.
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ests conduct their business. In the 1992 congressional elections,
nine out of the ten top recipients of PAC money from the agri-
culture sector sat on the House Agriculture Committee.46 Seven
out of the ten top recipients from the health care and energy
industries sat on the House committees dealing with health
reform and energy legislation.47 Most of this money, it should be
emphasized, comes from business rather than labor interests.48
Using political action committees as the measure, business inter-
ests outspent labor in 1992 by a ratio of almost 3:1. When indi-
vidual contributions are factored in, the ratio rises to 4.5:1. 4
3. Large and complex omnibus bills, with hundreds of pages and
thousands of clauses, also offer easy cover for members of Congress to vote
with the incoming tide of special interest campaign contributions. The
domestic sugar industry has always enjoyed legislative protection
in the form of import quotas and subsidies to sugar growers. A
1988 study by the U.S. Department of Commerce estimated that
protective legislation costs American consumers $3 billion per
year in the artificially inflated price of sugar.5" Eleven thousand
sugar growers received an average of $250,000 per grower for
price supports during the mid-1980s. In 1990 Congress
attempted, as part of an agricultural bill, to reduce sugar subsi-
dies and create flexible import quotas as means of lowering the
price consumers pay for sugar. Both efforts failed. Between
1985 and 1990, the sugar industry poured more than $2.6 million
into congressional election campaigns. Cane and beet sugar are
grown in very few states, so the number of legislators directly rep-
resenting sugar growers as a voting constituency is small. All
members of Congress represent consumers who, it would seem,
would want the price of sugar, as well as the federal deficit, cut.
46. MAKINSON, supra note 13, at 173. Data on individual contributions is
not accounted for in this total since research was incomplete at the time of
writing. However, the custom of PACs targeting members of Congress with
relevant committee assignments is similar to the way individual contributors
choose the candidates that they support.
47. Id. at 18-19, 22-23, 39, 44.
48. Most business PACs make their contributions to incumbents
regardless of their political party. In 1992 PACs representing agriculture,
communication/electronics, construction, defense, energy, finance/
insurance/real estate, health, law and lobbying, transportation, and
miscellaneous business all gave more than 70% of their money to incumbents.
Because Democrats are the majority in both houses, Democrats received more
money from business PACs than did Republicans, $67.8 million to $59.1
million. Id. at 3, 5.
49. MAKINSON, supra note 6, at 38. PACs and individuals affiliated with
business interests gave $175 million in the 1989-1990 election cycle. PACs and
individuals affiliated with labor gave just $36.6 million. Id.
50. Cobb, supra note 42, at 5.
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Nevertheless, the average contribution from the Sugar PACs to
Senators voting for the sugar industry's position was $18,416.
Opponents of the sugar industry received just $6,361. In The
House, pro-sugar members received an average of $8,841, oppo-
nents received $1,380.51
B. Campaign Contributions Encourage Legislative Inaction As Much
As They Influence Legislative Action
More difficult to measure in calculating the impact of pri-
vate money on legislative action is the enthusiasm or lack of
enthusiasm that a legislator brings to any one piece of legislation.
As former Congressman (D-WI) and former Secretary of Defense
Les Aspin has explained, "There are various degrees of being for
a bill - co-sponsoring it or fighting for it in committee, in
debate, on the floor, or in a leadership role on the floor. PAC
funds can determine a member's intensity as well as position."52
But even more symptomatic of the corrupting influence that pri-
vate money has on Congress is what legislators won't do in behalf
of a particular program, in the form of issues not raised, legisla-
tion not drafted, bills not pushed. Again, there exists no direct
evidence - and no way of establishing direct evidence - to
prove this correlation. But the unwillingness, over the years, of
Congress to tackle such issues as tort reform and health care
reform attest to the negative power that campaign contributions
have over government policy, especially in the face of popular
demands for policy reform.
The Association of Trial Lawyers of American (ATLA) spon-
sors the fourth most generous PAC funding congressional races.
The ALTA's primary legislation concern is stifling any kind of
tort reform that would restrict the right of individuals to sue for
unlimited amounts of money in liability cases.53 In 1992, a typi-
cal year, the trial lawyers gave more than $2.3 million to congres-
sional candidates. 92% went to Democrats, most of whom were
incumbents.54 Tort reform, when it is raised as an issue, has
51. Cobb, supra note 42, at 5-7. The figure of $2.6 million accounts for
PAC contributions only. Were individual 'contributions added in, the amount
would be higher.
52. Mark Green, Political Pac-Man, NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 13, 1982, at 21.
Large individual contributions, it should be added, can and do have the same
influence on legislation as PACs.
53. MAKINSON, supra note 6, at 187.
54. Id. at 186-87.
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been a Republican priority. The Democratic majority has shown
no interest in making tort reform an issue in Congress.55
The most obvious example of campaign contributions effect-
ing public policy (in this case both legislative action and inaction)
is that of health care reform. Harry Truman first called for a
national system of universal health insurance in 1949, and pro-
posals to achieve it have been raised - but never actively pushed
- in virtually every subsequent congressional session. It is not
coincidental that, over the past half century, health care interests
opposed to reform have given millions of dollars in campaign
contributions for the purpose of promoting congressional
inaction.56
Historically, an important opponent of health care reform
has been the American Medical Association (AMA). The cam-
paign contributions of AMPAC (the political action committee of
the AMA), have consistently been directed at political candidates
who put the economic interests of the medical profession over
the health care needs of the American people. For example,
55. While the Trial Lawyers, with their PAC contributions of $1.5 million,
pursue an anti-corporate agenda, most of the law and legal firms who
contribute money to candidates for Congress work for corporate clients that
represent special interests with a stake in congressional legislation. Of the top
twenty top lawyer and lobbyist contributors to congressional candidates in 1990,
OPEN SECRETS, supra note 22, at 74-75 identified twelve Washington law firms
engaged in lobbying and three Washington-based firms that just do lobbying as
following ATLA in the amount of their campaign contributions. For 1992,
PRICE OF ADMISSION, supra note 6, at 186-187, estimates that "lawyers and
lobbyists could account for $25 million in total contributions when donations
from individuals are added in." Significantly, lawyers and lobbyists give almost
all of their money to incumbants (75% in 1992). Their goal is to nourish
working relationships with members of Congress in order to have input into the
legislation that affects them and their clients. See also WHO WILL TELL, supra
note 3, at 162.
56. The full amount of money that the AMA and kindred organizations
have spent on campaign contributions since 1949 has never been calculated,
but over the past ten year period, health care industry PACs alone gave more
than $60 million. More than 40% of this money was given to members sitting
on the Senate and House committees with jurisdiction over health care issues.
Center for Responsive Politics, Paying the Piper - Money in Health Care
Politics: A Study of the Relationship Between Campaign contributions and
Congressional Decision-Making I (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Center for Responsive Politics). But the doctors also contribute money to
defeat their opponents. Thus, in 1986, the AMA and its allies spent $322,000 in
unsuccessful attempts to defeat Rep. Andrew Jacobs (D-IN) and $258,500 to
defeat Rep. Fortney Stark (D-DA). Both Stark and Jacobs were, and continue to
be, outspoken opponents of AMA positions and leading proponents of a
national health care system. Jeffrey H. Birhbaum & Brooks Jackson, AMA Faces
Setbacks as House Panel Movers to Slash Medicare Payments to Doctors, WALL ST. J.,
June 28, 1989, at A6.
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9 Although cigarette smoking as been identified by both the
Surgeon-General of the United States and the American Medical
Association (AMA) and is responsible for killing 418,690 Ameri-
cans in 1990, AMPAC (the political action committee of the
AMA), from 1989 to 1992, "gave significantly larger average con-
tribution to House members who favored tobacco-export promo-
tion than to those who opposed it."57
* Although the AMA itself has urged doctors to "demand
legislation intended to reverse the upward trend of firearm inju-
ries and deaths""8 and lobbied in behalf of the Brady Bill,
AMPAC "contributed less on average to supporters of handgun
control than to their opponents."59
* When the Bush Administration prohibited doctors work-
ing in federally-funded clinics from speaking about abortion to
their patients, the AMA lobbied have this "gag rule" repealed by
Congress. Yet, during the period that the "gag rule" was in
effect, "AMPAC's contributions revealed a marked preference for
House members who supported the gag rule over those who
opposed it."6'
Members of the House who supported the AMA's stated
public health position on the issues of smoking, gun control, and
the privileged privacy of the physical-patient relationship
received an average of $8,800 from the AMPAC. Those who
opposed the AMA on issues of public health but supported the
AMA position against health care reform received more, an aver-
age of $13,270, from the AMA's PAC. While no such correlations
have been done for voting patterns in the U.S. Senate, it should
be noted that SenatorJesse Helms (R-NC), who is considered to
be the voice of the tobacco industry in the U.S. Senate, and is
also a forceful opponent of gun control and abortion rights (not
to mention AIDs research), and is thus on issues of public health
in direct opposition to AMA positions, received, for his 1990 re-
election campaign, the maximum contribution of $20,000 from
AMPAC and another $99,000 from other health care
professionals.61
57. Joshua M. Sharfstein & Steven S. Sharfstein, Campaign Contributions
from the American Medical Political Action Committee to Members of Congress: For or
Against Public Health, NEw ENG. J. OF MED., Jan. 6, 1994, at 32. In fiscal year
1992, the U.S. Government spent $3.5 million to promote tobacco sales abroad.
58. C. Everett Koop & George D. Lundberg, Violence in America: A Public
Health Emergency: Time to Bite the Bullet Back, 267 JAMA 3075, 3075-76 (1992)
(cited in Sharfstein & Sharfstein, supra note 57).
59. Sharfstein & Sharfstein, supra note 57, at 32-33.
60. Id.
61. MAKINSON, supra note 27, at 270, 271.
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Figures such as these indicate that whatever position the
AMA takes regarding the health of the nation, the campaign con-
tributions of AMPAC (and its health industry allies) have more to
do with the economic health of the health care industry than
they have to do with the health care needs of the American
people.
In the early 1990's, large corporations began to realize that
escalating health care costs were hurting their competitive posi-
tion in the global market and began to push for changes in the
American health care system. Unable to prevent health care
reform from finally rising to the top of the legislative agenda, the
health care industry has increased its campaign contributions to
members of Congress and successfully narrowed the parameters
of debate on health care policy.
* In the 1992 election cycle, health care and insurance
PACs together gave a record $24.5 million to candidates for Con-
gress.6 2 For the health-care PACs alone, their contributions rep-
resented an increase of 36% from the 1990 election cycle.
Already, in the first thirteen months of the 1994 election cycle,
health care and insurance PACs contributed an additional $11.3
million, a 22% increase over what they gave during the first thir-
teen months since 1991 on their record-setting 1991-1992 pace.
(By contrast, during this same period, contributions by other
PACs have grown by only 2%.).63 In addition, from January 1,
1993, to January 31, 1994, large (over $200) contributions from
individuals whose disclosure forms show them to be associated
with the health care industry rose by 41% over the similar thir-
teen-month period in the 1992 election cycle.64
In previous years when advocates of health care reform tried
to raise the issue in Congress, they usually defined reform in
terms of the Canadian-style single-payer system. Because "single-
payer" substitutes one government-backed insurer for the
thousands of private insurance companies that now provide
62. CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, (analysis based on Federal Election
Commision Records). According to Larry Makinson, 72% of the contributions
from health care PACs and 79% of the contributions from insurance PACs went
to incumbents. Makinson, supra note 13, at 22, 41.
63. CITIZENS FUND, UNHEALTHY MONEY: HEALTH AND INSURANCE INDUSTRY
CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: THE HEALTH CARE DEBATE BEGINS,
PART VIII.2 (March 1994). According to this study, doctor and other health-
care provider PACs increased their giving by 39%. Hospital, HMO, and nursing
home PACs increased their contributions by 29%. Pharmaceutical companies
and medical equipment manufacturers increased their contributions by 21%.
Insurance companies and large donors connected to insurance companies
increased their contributions by 7%.
64. Id.
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health insurance coverage, it has always been bitterly opposed by
the insurance companies and its allies who ideologically oppose
any expansion of the public sector. Although single-payer sup-
porters have introduced a bill for a Canadian-style system in Con-
gress, it is not, despite mounting popular support, central to the
debate shaping up in Congress. As single-payer advocate Senator
Paul Wellstone (D-MN) has commented, "It's that old issue of
money and politics and power. Senators kept telling me when I
first came here, 'The single-payer bill you're introducing is the
most desirable, Paul, but the "groups" won't accept it."'65
C. Campaign Contributions Have Weakened Political Parties and
Created a System of Legislative Gridlock
Politicians often strive for a bipartisan consensus in policy
legislation. But when the two major parties serve as financial
conduits (and not, as they once did, as ideological centers) for
the same monied interests, it is reasonable to question the basis
for that political consensus.66 Too often the consensus is based
not on the soundness of a legislative proposal but on the conver-
gence of powerful interests who stand to gain from the way it is
drafted.67
As candidates become dependent on campaign money, the
importance of ideology and political parties are greatly dimin-
ished. This has had a particular effect on the Democratic Party.
Traditionally, the Democrats have been the party of working peo-
ple and organized labor. The Republicans have, generally, rep-
resented corporations and big business. In the 1970's,
congressional Democrats began to actively court corporate
money, arguing, convincingly it would seem, that as the majority
party in Congress, they could be counted upon to protect corpo-
65. Erwin Knoll, Second Opinion, PROcRESSrVE, Dec. 1993, at 4.
66. Reflecting their strategy of supporting incumbencts and the fact that
Democrats were a majority in Congress, PACs representing business interest
gave $67.8 million (or 53% of their contributions) to Democrats and $59
million (47%) to Republicans. 79% of its money went to incumbents, and only
8% went to candidates challenging incumbents. This balance is mirrored by
virtually all industry and business sectors. Labor, however, gave most of its
money (94%) to Democrats. Makinson, supra note 6, at 15.
67. In the health care debate, for example, the AMA, in the 1992 election
cycle, gave 51% of contributions of $3.2 million to the Democrats, 49% to the
Republicans. The insurance companies split its $9.7 million 53% for the
Democrats, 47% for the Republicans. The pharmaceutical industry, whose
profits are threatened by government controls, split its contributions of $2.9
million almost exactly in half. Makinson, supra note 13, at 23, 41-44.
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rate interests.68 In the words of (now Secretary of Labor) Robert
Reich, the Democrats "convinced big business and Wall Street it
was smarter to back incumbent Democrats than aspiring Republi-
cans." And, Reich continues, "[i]t is difficult to represent the lit-
tle fellow when the big fellow pays the tab."69 Were the
Democrats to reverse course and once again promote class-based
politics as the self-proclaimed party of the "working people," the
GOP would probably gain the campaign contributions from cor-
porate interest groups that the Democrats, as incumbents, now
get. This represents the dilemma of the Democratic Party. The
dilemma of working people is that with both parties representing
similar special interests, there is now no party that direcdy repre-
sents their own unique interests. As columnist Robert Kuttner
has described it, Democratic Party "campaigns are financed in
large part by the very people populists must challenge."70
There is a crisis in American democracy. Elections are
stacked in favor of candidates who support the policies of the
wealthy minority. If this economic elite cannot directly buy polit-
ical support for the programs it favors, it can - and does - use
its financial muscle to dominate debate and influence the legisla-
tion. While the evidence that monied interests openly buy polit-
ical support is indirect, the testimony of Washington-insiders and
the correlation of campaign contributions and voting records
create, at the minimum, an appearance of impropriety that sus-
tain the public's perception that money buys political power and
the views of the ordinary voter are unrepresented.
Given the corrupting impact - real and perceived - that
campaign contributions from private sources have on public poli-
tics, it is not surprising that so many Americans have given up on
their electoral system and come to believe that politics doesn't
work for them. What some have described as a problem of citi-
zen apathy might, given this situation, better be described as a
rational response to an unfair political system. Acknowledging
the public's unease, politicians speak boldly of campaign finance
reform and of making the system more responsive to the voter.
But unwilling to tamper with a system that has rewarded them
with power, incumbent politicians draft legislation that, in the
name of change, institutionalizes the inequities and undemo-
cratic practices of the existing system.
68. See JACKSON, supra note 20 (describing the successful effort of
congressional Democrats to attract corporate money).
69. Robert B. Reich, Have the Democrats Lost Their Souls? Yes: Blame Election
Funds, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 1989, at A29.
70. Robert Kuttner, Democrats Should Stick to Their Script, NEWSDAY, Nov. 10,
1988, at 90.
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III. THE STRUCTURE OF REFORM
A. History of Reform
For almost a century, Congress has been trying to reform the way
candidates for political office fund their election campaigns.
The first attempt, the Tillman Act of 1907,7 had no provision for
enforcement. Further, in prohibiting contributions from corpo-
rations while allowing individual owners, managers and execu-
tives to contribute as much they wanted, the bill effectually
undermined its purpose. Subsequent legislation followed a simi-
lar pattern: contradictory provisions and inadequate enforce-
ment. As President Lyndon Johnson said about the Corrupt
Practice Act 72 that was in effect from 1925 to 1971, these bills
proved themselves to be "more loophole than law. ''73 Until 1971,
there were no effective limitations on contributions or spending
and no effective disclosure laws to monitor the flow of contribu-
tions. As Brooks Jackson has described it, the system was strictly
"cash and carry," with so-called "bagmen" (conspicuously repre-
senting one or another special interest group) inconspicuously
giving members of Congress bags full of dollars. 4
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, 75 as
amended in 1974,76 1976,77 and 197978 were serious attempts to
level the playing field in federal elections and curb the influence
that special interests were perceived as having over government
affairs. The 1971 and 1974 FECA represented the boldest
attempts at reforming campaign financing law. The 1971 FECA
provided for total public financing of the presidential general
election. The 1974 FECA provided for partial public financing
(based on a system of matching funds for contributions of under
$200) for the presidential primary election. Other provisions
placed limitations on the amount of money individuals and polit-
ical action committees could give to candidates and to political
parties during each election cycle, placed limits on the amount
of money individuals could give to political action committees,
and created the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to monitor
71. Public Act of January 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
72. Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, §§ 310-19, 43 Stat. 1070
(1925).
73. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Political Process in America, Special
Message to Congress on Election Reform (May 25, 1965), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF
LYNDON B. JOHNSON 565.
74. JACKSON, supra note 20, at 58.
75. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
76. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
77. Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976).
78. Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1979).
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contributions and expenditures, and administer and enforce the
law.7
9
B. Problems of the 1970s FECA Reforms
Our overall assessment of the 1970 FECA reforms is that
they legitimized and institutionalized the worst aspects of the sys-
tem they were supposed to change. Campaign spending has con-
tinued to rise at a rate far above that of inflation. Incumbents
have continued to raise more money than their opponents. Spe-
cial interests have continued to dominate campaign giving, and
public disaffection from our electoral democracy has continued
its rise unabated.
e Contributions by corporations (prohibited in principle, if
not in actuality by the Tillman Act) were effectively legalized (in
actuality though not in principle) by the institutionalizing of
political action committees as legal conduits for campaign
money.
* There was no aggregate limit to the amount of money a
candidate could raise. What candidates felt they needed to raise
to win, they raised. Because private interest groups believe that
their campaign contributions give them political power, there is
no limit to the amount of money that the private sector is willing
to make available.80
* The provisions for the disclosure of individual contribu-
tions were ineffective. While the interest group behind every
PAC can be identified, interest groups can disguise the weight of
79. Limitations on the campaign expenditures were struck down by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In a split decision,
the court argued that campaing spending was a protected form of free speech
that could only be abridged if the limitation was voluntary. This insistence on
voluntary compliance does not constitute a barrier for meaningful campaign
finance reform, which we define as total public financing (democratic
financing) of elections. But the skyrocketing costs of political campaigns since
1976, see supra note 6, suggests that the Buckley decision should be revisited,
especially its argument that campaign contributions are protected free speech.
The only other problematic area in Buckley is its argument that independent
expenditures are also protected as free speech. This issue is discussed below, see
infra part IV.
80. Money has never been a problem for candidates who felt the need to
go out and raise it. In 1992, New York Republican Alfonse M. D'Amato spent
$11.5 million to win reelection to the Senate. New York Democrat Charles E.
Schumer spent $2.1 million for his reelection to the House of Representative.
The record for spending is held by Republican Jesse Helms of North Carolina
who, in 1990, spent $17.7 million for his reelection to the United States Senate.
Makinson, supra note 6, at 8.
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their contributions by using individuals as the conduits for their
giving.8 1
e The Federal Election Commission, established with polit-
ical appointees from the two major parties, lacked the indepen-
dence to vigorously enforce the law.
* A system of partial public financing of the presidential pri-
mary did not work. Candidates in the primary who raised a cer-
tain amount of money in small contributions received matching
grants from the federal treasury. The idea was to level the play-
ing field so that candidates without access to large contributions
would have public funds to run a competitive race. Despite this,
the candidates who raised the most money for the primary elec-
tion went on to win their party's primary. Big contributions by
wealthy financial backers eased George Bush's path to the
Republican presidential nomination in 1988 and 1992 and ena-
bled Michael Dukakis and Bill Clinton to outlast their rivals in
the Democratic primaries and win the Democratic nomination in
those two election years.8
2
Besides failing to level the playing field, partial public
financing of the primary did little to break the bond between
"vested givers" and presidential nominations. The dependence
of the candidates on special interest money was noted by John
Marino, the former chairman of the New York State Democratic
Party, when, during the 1992 New Hampshire presidential pri-
mary, he observed, "[t] his process stinks. [The presidential candi-
dates] are running all over New Hampshire all day long, and they
get on a plane and race to New York for dinner to grovel for
money. They hardly see a normal voter. They don't go to sub-
81. Federal law requires that candidates make their best effort to disclose
the name, address, occupation, and employer of every individual who gives
them more than $200. In the 1990 election 10 Senate and 21 House members
failed to disclose (or require their contributors to list) the occupations and
employers of more than 20% of their big contributors. More than 50% of the
large contributors to the campaigns of Gary Franks (R-CT), Jesse Helms (R-
NC),John Conyers (D-MI), Neil Abercrombie (D-HA), and William J. Jefferson
(D-LA) failed to disclose their employer and/or occupation. Helms and Phil
Gramm each had non-complying (and technically illegal) individual
contributions worth more than $1.5 million. Newt Gingrich (R-GA) had the
most illegal contributions in the House, $174,050. Makinson, supra note 27, at
35.
82. During the 1992 Democratic primary, Bill Clinton raised $25.1
million from individual contributions. His 7 Democratic opponents raised just
$19.6 million combined. The second biggest fundraiser, Jerry Brown, raised
$5.1 million, most of it in $100 or under contributions. As a result of his
fundraising prowess, Clinton received $12.5 million in federal matching funds
to Brown's $4.2 million.
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way stops, they go to Wall Street."83 A few days before the New
Hampshire primary, with Clinton's candidacy in question as a
result of the Jennifer Flowers "scandal," financiers from
Goldman, Sachs and other Wall Street investment houses, raised
more than $750,000 for him at a dinner at the Sheraton Hotel.
As one reporter observed, "that dinner signaled to a lot of people
that some very smart money was behind him. It was critical to
Clinton's campaign."84 Among Clinton's Wall Street backers
were Goldman, Sachs' Robert Rubin who contributed more than
$100,000 to the candidate and Robert Altman of the Blackstone
Group who along with other members of this investment house
contributed xxxx. Rubin and Altman went on to become Presi-
dent Clinton's principle economic advisors.85
e A provision for total public financing of the presidential
election was undercut by soft money contributions to the major
parties. The "soft money" loophole allows PACs and individuals
to pour unlimited amounts of unregulated (or nonfederal)
money into candidate campaigns using state and national polit-
ical parties as conduits. Soft money thus completely nullifies the
limits on campaign contributions that are at the heart of current
campaign finance law.86 In the presidential general election, eli-
gible candidates who agree not to raise money from the private
sector are entitled to full public financing of their election cam-
paign." In theory, this provision should create a level playing
field, at least for major party candidates, and prohibit special
interests from giving presidential candidates money. Indeed, Bill
Clinton and George Bush each received a stipend of $xx to
finance their campaigns in the 1992 general election. But
because of the soft money loophole, the two major national par-
ties continued to raise money from the private sector for the
83. Michael Specter, Campaign Trail Leads to New York for Cash, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 1992, at A46.
84. Paul Starobin, An Affair to Remember, NAT'LJ.,Jan. 16, 1993, at 120.
85. Thomas Ferguson, "Organized Capitalism," Fiscal Policy, and the 1992
Democratic Campaign, in NEW PERSPECTIVE ON AMERICAN POLrrICs 126 (Lawrence
C. Dodd & Calvin Jillson eds., 1993).
86. See Center for Responsive Politics, Soft Money '88 (1989); Josh
Goldstein, Soft Money, Real Dollars: Soft Money in the 1992 Elections (1993)
[hereinafter Goldstein, Soft Money]; Joshua Goldstein, The $43 Million Dollar
Loophole: Soft Money in the 1990 Elections (1991).
87. Eligible candidates include the nominees of the parties who finished
first and second during the previous presidential election, and any candidate
from a party that received from 5% to 20% of the vote in the previous
presidential general election. These 5%-20% are considered minor candidates,
however, and receive public financing in proportion to their previous election
year vote.
19941
490 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 8
presidential race - more than $83 million in 1991 and 1992
alone - just as they did before there was reform.88 Virtually all
this money was raised from large contributions by corporate and
labor circles.8 9
C. Current Efforts At Reform
In his inaugural address, President Clinton acknowledged
the failure of the FECAs of the 1970's. Proclaiming that under
the current system, "power and privilege.. .shout down the voice
of the people," he called for a new and "bold" effort at campaign
finance reform.9" The bills that the President introduced to
Congress were not bold, however. And as watered down by Con-
gress, the final bills, S 391 and HR 3,92 contain all the structural
defects of previous campaign finance legislation.
9 Both bills provide for voluntary spending limits, but the
maximum limits are set so high that, in actuality, they legalize the
excesses of current practice. In the House, the limits have been
set at $600,000 which is higher than the average incumbent now
spends for reelection.93 But other provisions in the bill render
this limitation essentially meaningless. Should the House bill be
passed in the 1994 legislative session and go into effect, as
intended, for the 1996 congressional election, the spending lim-
its for most House races will have risen to almost $1 million (and
would still be rising with the rate of inflation).9'
88. Goldstein, Soft Money, supra note 82, at 3-4.
89. Id. at 6-11, 15-33. In actuality, soft money came mostly from
corporate circles. The business sector contributed $16.9 million to the
Democratic Party and $34.3 million to the Republican Party. Labor gave the
Democrats $4.1 million and Republicans just $60,100. Approximately 200
contributors gave more than $100,000 with one contributor, Archer-Daniels-
Midland, contributing more than $1 million, and 7 other contributors more
than $500,000. The largest source of soft money came from individuals and
organizations connected to the financial, insurance, and real estate industries.
They gave the Republicans $10.9 million and the Democrats $6.2 million.
90. "We Force the Spring," Transcript of Inaugural Address by President Bill
Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1993, at A15 [hereinafter Inaugural].
91. S. 3, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
92. H.R. 3, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
93. Beth Donovan, House Will Vote on Limits Nearing $1 Million in '96, 51
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3091, 3091 (1993)
94. Id. at 3091-92. Under HR 3, House candidates would be allowed a 10
percent exemption for overhead costs and an unlimited exemption for legal
fees and taxes. In addition, candidates who won their primary by less than a
margin of 20% would have their spending limit raised by $200,000 above the
$600,000 limit. In the 1992 election, 192 House candidates would have
qualified for that $200,000 addition. Id.
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The voluntary limits on spending in S 3 range from $1.2 mil-
lion to $5.5 million for the general elections. S 3 also places lim-
its of spending in the primary election, 67% of the limit for the
general election or $2.75 million, which ever is less. To this total,
candidates could add on 15% of what they spend for legal and
accounting costs (up to a maximum of $300,000). In addition, S
3 also factors in a cost-of-living adjustment.95
e Both the House and Senate bills ostensibly prohibit soft
money, but then add exemptions. Historically with soft money,
as with contribution limits, it has been the exemptions more than
the prohibitions that have defined (and undermined) campaign
finance bills.
9 The Senate bill prohibits public financing. The House bill
offers partial public financing in the form of vouchers worth up
to $200,000 based on matching funds for small contributions.
The amount of partial public financing received from the gov-
ernment will neither level the playing field nor deter the special
interests. Candidates will take the public money and continue to
maximize their fundraising from private sources. The special
interest groups will continue to favor incumbents and the incum-
bents will continue to outspend their challengers.
* The Senate and House disagree on political action com-
mittees. The Senate prohibits contributions from PACs alto-
gether; the House limits PAC contributions to one-third the
amount that a candidate is allowed to spend which, with all the
exemptions, could approach $500,000. Although some reform
groups have highlighted PACs as the most malignant channel for
special interest money, FEC data, analyzed by the Center for
Responsive Politics, indicates that candidates receive more
money from individuals representing identifiable special inter-
ests than they do from political action committees. 96 In the
absence of a total ban on all campaign contributions, the elimi-
nation of PAC money would discriminate against ordinary Ameri-
cans who, as individuals, cannot afford to make the kind of large
contributions that buy access and influence in political circles.
Corporate interests would continue to pour large sums of money
into candidates' war-chests, however. Instead of using PACs as a
conduit, they shareholders, owners, executives, managers, and
95. Beth Donovan, Senate Passes Campaign Finance by Gutting Public
Funding, 51 CONG. Q. WKL. REP. 1533-36 (1993).
96. Based on contributions reports filed by candidates at the FEC, the
Center for Responsive Politics analyzed numerous resources and was able to
identify individuals that gave 75% of the $101 million that individuals making
contributions of over $200 per candidate gave to House and Senate candidates
for the 1990 election. Goldstein, Soft Money, supra note 82, at 26.
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executives would be able to make individual contributions just as
they did when the Tillman Act was supposed to bring about cam-
paign finance reform.
Elections are the centerpiece of our democratic politics. We
must break the flawed structural patterns of previous efforts at
reform and decisively sever the ties between money and politics.
Meaningful campaign finance reform would definitely eliminate
money as a factor in a person's political opportunity, access,
influence and success, and thereby give ordinary citizens a
greater voice in governmental affairs.
IV. DEMOCRATICALLY FINANCED ELECTIONS
If our country is to advance rather than defer its democratic
ideals, campaign finance reform must sever the ties between pri-
vate financiers and the electoral system, thus engendering trust
in politicians and confidence in the way government is run.
Effective legislation for campaign finance reform must also elimi-
nate money as the decisive factor in a person's political opportu-
nity, access, influence and success; create an electoral system that
engenders equality of opportunity so that ordinary citizens who
can prove that they have popular support (rather than, as now,
access to a substantial amount of money) are encouraged to run;
establish a financially level playing field so that challengers, as
well as incumbents, have the resources to conduct competitive
campaigns; and be free of the loopholes that have undermined
all previous attempts at reform.
There is only one way to effectively assure that elections live
up to rather than diminish the ideals of democracy. This is by a
system of total publicly financed elections that would prohibit all
campaign contributions from private sources. The Working
Group on Electoral Democracy, an association of grassroots activ-
ists and researchers, has drafted a model bill for Democratically
Financed Elections [DFE] that can be adapted for elections for
state and local elections. 7 Our purpose here is not to present
this model bill in all of it's complex detail, but to describe the
concepts and assumptions that make it workable and effective.
How DFE Works In order to conform with the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1976 decision, Buckley v. Valeo,98 DFE would be strictly
voluntary. Although there would be strong disincentives for
doing so, candidates would be free to choose private over public
97. A detailed version of this model bill for Democratically Financed
Elections is available from the Working Group on Electoral Democracy, Keets
Road, Deerfield, MA, 01342.
98. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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financing. Candidates who agree not to raise and spend private
money during the formal election campaign periods, and who
prove their eligibility for public financing by raising a large
number of $5 contributions during a designated pre-primary
qualifying period, would receive public financing (in the form of
credit) for all their primary and general election expenses. The
emphasis on the number rather than the monetary amount of Quali-
fying Contributions would favor candidates with actual grassroots
support rather than, as now, candidates with access to large
amounts of start-up money.
Individuals thinking of running for federal office would be
allowed to raise a small amount of private "seed money" (with a
$100 limit on contributions) in order prove that they have the
popular support for public financing. This provision would allow
people to contribute money to the candidates of their choice
when it most counted, to help their candidates qualify for public
financing. Seed money could not be spent during the desig-
nated primary and general election campaign periods. Under
DFE, the primary election would serve a dual function. Not only
would it determine a party's candidate in intraparty competition,
as now, but it would determine party eligibility for public financ-
ing in the general election. 9 Parties that received at least 20% of
the primary vote (the total vote of all primary candidates), would
receive total public financing for the general election with the
money, in the form of credit, going to their respective winning
candidates. Parties that received between 5% and 20% of the
primary vote would receive proportional amounts of public
financing, in the form of credit, with the money going to their
respective winning candidates. Other provisions would allow
independent candidates to prove their eligibility for public
financing of the general election, regulate and limit independ-
ent expenditures, and provide media benefits and equalize frank-
ing privileges for eligible candidates.
99. By making the primary an eligibility test for public financing in the
general election, DFE allows new or third parties the opportunity to receive
public financing in the election that they are currently contesting. For
example, if primary candidates of a third party receive more than 20% of the
combined vote of all primary candidates, the winning candidate of that party's
primary is eligible for total public financing. This represents a conceptual
advance over the way new or third parties are treated under existing, law.
Currently, presidential candidates of new parties are ineligible for public
financing in the general election. The amount of votes they receive in the
general election determines their eligibility for public financing in the next
presidential election. But in the election being contested, third party
candidates have expended time and effort raising money while the candidates
of the two major parties can campaign with public money.
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As private associations, political parties can, of course, raise
private money. Because of the potential for abuse (parties pour-
ing money into the races of individual candidates), congressional
candidates would not be able to receive direct contributions
from political parties. Candidates would, however, be able to
receive in-kind contributions up to a value of 10% of their public
financing allotment. These provisions would encourage parties
to put more emphasis on grassroots organizing and less on
media-buys. The ability of parties to support their individual can-
didates would give parties the opportunity of mustering their
resources behind candidates who adhered to their platform and
policies. To completely close the soft money loophole, any
expenditure promoting a federal candidate would have to be
paid for out of the federal candidate's publicly financed line of
credit.
The use of credit card technology would make DFE easy to
enforce. Candidates will be issued special FEC "Fair Election"
credit cards with which they would make their campaign
purchases and pay bills. Once candidates exhausted their line of
credit, they would have no more money for campaigning.
The cost of DFE is dependent on the amount of credit can-
didates are to receive and the number of candidates who qualify
for public financing in any one election. Because the system will
level the playing field in both the primary and general election,
we expect more candidates to run for office than under the cur-
rent system (and with candidates having equal resources, races to
be more tightly contested). On the other hand, candidates will
save money on fundraising and on some media costs.' 00 Even
with more candidates eligible for public financing that currently
run for Congress now, we estimate the cost of DFE for Congress
to be no higher than $500 million a year or approximately $5 per
taxpayer. Whether the cost of DFE is $3, $5 or even $10 per year,
it would represent an enormous savingwhen compared to the hun-
dreds of dollars each taxpayer is now paying for unnecessary tax
breaks, bailouts, subsidies, regulatory exemptions, and other leg-
islative favors that big money campaign contributors now wrest
from the government under the current system of privately
100. A study by Sarah Fritz and Dwight Morris analyzing campaign costs
shows that, in 1990, candidates for the House of Representatives directly spent
an average of 17.7% of their total expenditures on fundraising. Candidates for
the Senate directly spent an average of 30.8% on fundraising. House
candidates also spent 22.5% of their expenditures on the media, while Senate
candidates spent 33.3% on the media. SARAH FRrrz & DwmGr MoRuis,
HANDBOOK OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING IN THE 1990 CONGRESSIONAL RACES 8-9
(1992).
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financed elections. Not only would DFE break the financial
bond that special interests have over our electoral democracy,
but it would create a level playing field between incumbents and
challengers, encourage competitive elections with more candi-
dates and, we believe, a higher-turnover of elected officials. In
addition, DFE would engender renewed trust in our government.
With elected officials beholden to their constituents rather than
to their funders, citizens would have reason to vote and to partici-
pate more actively in the democratic process.
V. PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM
Most Americans agree with the country's political critics that
big campaign contributions buy interest groups special privileges
in government. In the 1960s, surveys found that only 28% of the
public believed that "government is pretty much run by a few big
interests looking out for themselves." 01 More recent polls, ask-
ing the same question, found that 75% of the respondents
agreed with the statement. 0 2 If people believe that government
works only for a privileged few, they lose the incentive to partici-
pate in politics, which is something different than losing the
desire to participate in government. As the Kettering Report
emphasized, the American people aren't alienated from politics;
they feel powerless and left out.1° 3 "When an individual is no
longer a participant," Dr. Martin Luther King once observed,
"when he (sic) no longer feels a sense of responsibility to his soci-
ety, the content of democracy is emptied."'0 4 Today millions of
Americans feel this emptiness, and it is our electoral system -
the centerpiece of our democratic achievement - that is a prin-
ciple cause.
Obviously, however, elected officials are not willingly going
to abolish an electoral system that all but guarantees their hold
on power. The public apparently knows this. According to the
Gordon Black survey, 69% of all voters agreed with the state-
ment, "Current incumbents will never reform the political pro-
cess."10 5 Most political activists who work within the system
101. GREIDER, supra note 2, at 23.
102. Id. at 23. CBS News/New York Times poll, April 25, 1992; Gallup
Organization, April 24, 1992; ABC News poll, April 19, 1992; CBS News/New
York Times poll, March 31, 1992; ABC News/Washington Post poll, October 22,
1991. Survey data provided by The Roper Center at the University of
Connecticut.
103. Kettering, supra note 3.
104. THE WORDS OF MARTIN LuTHER KING, JR., SELECTED By CORETrA
SCOTT KING 19 (1993).
105. Black, supra note 4, at 7 (Table 2).
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would no doubt agree. Reform is unlikely, according to Ken Mel-
ley, the director of Advocacy Programs for the National Educa-
tion Association, "so long as the self-interest of legislators remain
center-stage."" °6 And it is self-evident that the special interests
themselves are not going to support reform legislation that
undermines their privileged position in the political equation.
But change is possible, if, in the words of Brooks Jackson,
"reformers think big." 107 For if the American people are alien-
ated from elections they are not, as the Kettering study indicated,
apathetic about politics. Americans want to take part in the polit-
ical process; the reason that they don't is that they feel that the
current system effectively shuts them out.1" 8  The Kettering
results are substantiated by recent polling data. As Benjamin
Barber writes in his book Strong Democracy, "Surveys and polls sug-
gest over and over again that while citizens distrust politics in the
abstract, they desire concrete participation and work to enlarge
the scope if that participation when they have once experienced
it."109
We believe that a grassroots movement is needed to force
politicians to support Democratically Financed Elections. And
we believe that if the issue of democratic reform is effectively
framed - so it appeals to both the economic self-interest of the
American people and their most patriotic ideals - the public
will respond. There are two principle approaches to galvanize
popular public support. Both are essential. The first is by pro-
moting Democratically Financed Elections within the context of
existing issues and issue-oriented organizations. The second way
is by creating grassroots organizations to push specifically for
Democratically Financed Elections and other procedural
reforms.
The Issue Approach: As important as total public financing is
to the revitalization of democratic government, it is also a reform
that makes other reforms possible. The influence that monied
interests wield over elections blocks the prospect of meaningful
reform on many issues, including, in addition to health care,
affordable housing, labor's right to organize, progressive taxa-
tion, the protection of family farms, safe energy, environmental
protection, and a range of foreign policy issues. The "issue
approach" is based on the observation that activists and organiza-
106. Hansen, supra note 15, at 57.
107. JACKSON, supra note 20.
108. Kettering, supra note 3.
109. BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY' PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR
A NEw AGE 266, (1984).
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tions that are committed to the advancement of important policy
issues quickly understand how the current electoral and cam-
paign finance system is stacked against their agenda.
The Pro-Democracy Approach: Some activists will be inspired to
take on the issue of democracy itself and to create new organiza-
tions with that focus - organizations whose specific purpose is to
promote Democratically Financed Elections and other proce-
dural reforms. These organizations would concentrate on rais-
ing the issue of democratically vs. privately financed elections
and would begin to create the political consciousness and the
organizational network essential to building a movement around
democratic reforms. Other reforms on a democracy platform
might include universal voter registration, fairer ballot access for
independent candidates and third parties, and multi-party (i.e.,
fusion) endorsements. The idea of free and equal access to the
media, which already enjoys popular support, could be promoted
independent of the need for democratically financed elections.
American history has been one long struggle to extend and
fulfill the ideals of democracy. As a legacy of the efforts of the
abolitionists, suffragettes, civil rights workers, and thousands of
others, the right to vote has been extended from property own-
ing males to all males and then to women and people of color.
Each successful effort in extending the franchise came in the
face of intense and sometimes violent opposition. The Voting
Rights Act of 1964 supposedly extended the unimpeded right to
vote to all Americans regardless of race, gender, religion, or eco-
nomic status. But gaining that right has not removed the barri-
ers to equal political participation. The 1982 amendments to the
Voting Rights Act prohibit any system or arrangement that causes
certain voters to have "less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice." 110 Despite these bold words, the
rich individuals and powerful special interests that finance elec-
tion campaigns still have greater opportunity than other Ameri-
cans to participate forcefully in political affairs, elect their
candidates, and directly influence the affairs of government.
"Our democracy must be not only the envy of the world but
the engine of our own renewal," President Clinton declared in
his inaugural address.111 That engine cannot be a collection of
worn pistons and burnt-out valves. Reform legislation cobbled
together from old parts will not take our democracy into the
twenty-first century. In the American experience, we have
110. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
111. Inaugura4 supra note 90.
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learned that change is meaningful only when it is a product of
political pressure, popular demand. For the American way is to
agitate for change from below, to expand and enliven democracy
at the grassroots. According to Gwen Patton, a veteran of the
civil rights movement of the 1960's, "getting rid of privately
financed elections is the unfinished business of the Civil Rights
Movement."' 12
We believe that the American people are ready to renew the
struggle for democratic ideals and that they will rally around the
common-sense proposition that a democratic government means
democratically financed elections and that candidates for public
office should not be financed by private money. A grassroots
movement could transform the 1990s into a decade of political
reform and democratic renewal.
112. Gwen Patton, Speech at Working Conference on Electoral
Democracy, Waveland, Mississippi, February 2, 1990.
